Beware the northern heights


Send Indian troops to Iraq by all means, but deploy them among friends


Jasjit Singh




Opinion on sending our forces to Iraq appears to be deeply divided and this is likely to make an objective approach to the issues involved somewhat difficult. But some points need to be considered in arriving at a conclusion based on national interest within the framework of the principles we hold important. It is amply clear that our decision must be based on the right reasons.

Firstly, the situation in Iraq is far from normal although it would be difficult to agree with those who see an active insurgency raging there. It is also clear that American forces, for a variety of reasons, will find it increasingly difficult to restore peace and stability in Iraq. Very senior British officials have been quoted as saying that the American-led effort is “in chaos” and suffering from “a complete absence of strategic direction”. What emerges is a “grim picture of American incompetence and mismanagement” of the Coalition Provisional Authority to run post-Saddam Iraq. If this were not enough, the British army has also admitted that serious errors were made by its forces that led to the killing of six soldiers in central Iraq last week.


This has to be seen in the context that the Indian Parliament had “condemned” the US-led invasion of Iraq. Our contribution to international commitments to peacekeeping have inevitably been undertaken either under UN mandate, or on request from a legitimate government of the country concerned. Unfortunately there is no Iraqi government, not even an interim one, nearly three months after the removal of the Saddam regime. UN mandate is a serious problem since the Security Council recognises the occupying powers as the legitimate “authority” while calling upon all countries to provide humanitarian assistance and help in Iraq’s stabilisation. It is not in our interest to see Iraq slide into anarchy and ethno-religious radicalism. Stability in Iraq would be best fostered by a pluralistic, accommodative, politico-administrative dispensation. We have always stood for this, and it has assumed even greater importance with the rise of radical political use of religion. And we have the experience to help a country re-establish normalcy and stability.

Our participation in the stabilisation of Iraq is not really an issue between the US and India, but much more an issue involving the people of Iraq and those of countries in the broader region. If we decide to send forces to Iraq, then prudent policy measures must be adopted to ensure that we are able to achieve the political goals we set for our mission. In the absence of a broad-based government acceptable to the Iraqi people, and the peculiar situation created by UN Security Council resolution 1483, the best way forward would be to first consult the community leaders in Iraq on their views regarding Indian forces for stabilisation. We should make it clear that our aim would be to assist the Iraqi people to restore normal life and help in establishing administration by Iraqis at the earliest. At the same time, given the question of reaction in the broader region around Iraq, we should consult with all countries in West Asia. Our participation should be conditional to positive responses from these two sources rather than any technicality of UN mandate or emotionalism.

The second critical measure would be to clearly define our political and military goals and objectives in sending the forces. This was the core mistake made in sending forces to Sri Lanka in 1987 and the Indian army was finally pilloried for its “failure” by the Indian elite in spite of the fact that it succeeded in ensuring the integrity of Sri Lanka at great cost to itself. Such definition of aims and objectives is even more critical in the present case in view of the complex situation. Equally, we must insist on autonomy of decision-making and management/command of our contingent in keeping with the defined goals and objectives. The role of the Coalition Provisional Authority would then be really one of inter-zonal coordination of respective actions rather than one of hierarchical chain of command. Since a great deal of the work would be related to humanitarian assistance, we must have the right to directly supply such assistance under our control.

This also leads us to the issue of the zone to which our forces should be assigned. The Kurdish-dominated area in the north could pose serious complications in the context of seven decades of Iraqi-Kurdish conflict where chemical weapons were used not long ago. We cannot take sides in an internal separatist conflict which may become increasingly intense as Iraqis try to form a post-Saddam administration. Broadly speaking, pro-Indian sentiment is stronger as one moves southward in Iraq; and so is the affection and respect for the Indian military. The most desirable sector would be the Basra region. The next best option would be the area north of Basra district and south of the Baghdad region, that is, the Najaf-Karbala-Amara-Kut region. This is a Shia-majority area and help in its stabilisation would have a tremendous positive impact on the country (which is 62 per cent Shia) and in furthering our relations with Iran to the east. Iraqi nationalism based on pluralism is much stronger than any ethno-sectarian loyalties, except in the Kurdish mountain regions.

Last but not the least, our success or failure would finally be judged by the circumstances and results achieved. This would require a substantive effort in management of information dissemination. We will not be able to afford the mistakes of Somalia where the extremely successful Indian peacekeeping contingent in huge areas of the country came to be viewed also in terms of failure simply because the US-Pakistan forces messed up things in Mogadishu.

An active media policy based on transparency and sensitivity to Iraqi interests and our goals is a pre-requisite to success. Our media is capable of doing it without being “embedded”, as Kargil showed.